Treasury Department Needs Your Help

[Guest Treasury Department]

The Department of the Treasury released a request for public input today on an insurance program for troubled assets which is required by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). The purpose of this program is to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system, while minimizing any potential long term negative impact on taxpayers.

 

Under the EESA the Secretary is charged with establishing a program that will guarantee principal of, and interest on, troubled assets originated or issued prior to March 14, 2008. The program may take any form and may vary by asset class, but it must be voluntary and self-funding. The Secretary has the authority to set premiums to reflect the credit risk characteristics of the insured assets so as to ensure that taxpayers are fully protected.

 

Treasury invites comment on how the program should be structured to minimize adverse selection, including how premiums should be calculated, what events should trigger insurance payout, what form that payout should take, and which institutions and assets should be eligible. The Department also asks for public comment on technical considerations, including what legal, accounting, or regulatory issues would arise and what administrative challenges the program will create.

 

The Treasury Department is particularly interested in comments on the specific questions set forth below.

 

1. What are the key issues Treasury should address in establishing the guarantee program for troubled assets?

 

1.1 Should the program offer insurance against losses for both individual whole loans and individual mortgage backed securities (MBS)?

 

1.2 What is the appropriate structure for such a program? How should the program accommodate various classes of troubled assets? Should the program differ by the degree to which an asset is troubled?

 

1.2.1 What are the key issues to consider with respect to guaranteeing whole first mortgages?

 

1.2.2 What are the key issues to consider with respect to guaranteeing HELOCs and other junior liens?

 

1.2.3 What are the key issues to consider with respect to guaranteeing MBS?

 

1.2.4 What are the key issues associated with guaranteeing financial instruments other than mortgage related assets originated or issued before March 14, 2008 that could be important for promoting financial market stability?

 

1.3 What are the key issues to consider with respect to setting the payout of the guarantee?

 

1.3.1 Should the payout be equal to principal and interest at the time the asset was originated or to some other value? What should that value be? What would be the impact of offering guarantees of less than 100 percent of original principal and interest?

 

1.3.2 Should payout vary by asset class? If so, please describe using the same asset classes as enumerated under 1.21-1.24.

 

1.4 What event should trigger the payout under the guarantee? Should the holder be able to present the claim at will or should there be a set date? Should this date differ by asset class? Should this date differ by the degree to which the asset is troubled?

 

1.5 Should the holder be permitted to sell the troubled asset with the program guarantee? If appropriate, should asset sales be restricted to eligible financial institutions or should there be no restrictions to promote liquidity in the market place?

 

1.6 What are the key issues the Treasury should consider in determining the possible losses to which the government would be exposed in offering the guarantee? What methodology should be used to determine possible losses? Does it differ by asset class? If so, please describe using the same asset classes as enumerated under 1.21-1.24. Does it differ by the degree to which the asset is troubled?

 

1.7 What are the key elements the Treasury should consider in setting premiums for this program? Is it feasible or appropriate to set premiums reflecting the prices of similar assets purchased under Section 101 of the EESA?

 

1.7.1 If use of prices of similar assets purchased under Section 101 of the EESA are not feasible or appropriate, should premiums be set by use of market mechanisms similar to (but separate from) those contemplated for the troubled assets purchase program? How would this be implemented? If not feasible or appropriate, what methodologies should be used to set premiums?

 

1.7.2 Do these considerations of feasibility or appropriateness vary by asset class? If so, please describe using the same asset classes as enumerated under 1.21-1.24. Should the premiums vary by the degree to which the asset is troubled?

 

1.8 How and in what form should payment of premiums be scheduled?

 

2. How should a guarantee program be designed to minimize adverse selection, given that the program must be voluntary? Is there a way to limit adverse selection that avoids individually analyzing assets?

 

3. What legal, accounting, or regulatory issues would such a guarantee program raise?

 

4. What administrative and/or operational challenges would such a guarantee program create?

 

4.1. What expertise would Treasury need to operate such a guarantee program? Please describe for all facets of the program.

 

5. What are the key issues to be considered in determining the eligibility of a given type of financial institution to participate in this program? Should these eligibility provisions differ from those of the troubled asset purchase program?

 

6. What are the key issues to be considered in determining the eligibility of a given asset to be guaranteed by this program? Should eligibility provisions of assets to be guaranteed under this program differ from those of the troubled asset purchase program?

 

7. Assuming the guarantee is priced to cover expected claims, are there situations (perhaps created by regulatory or accounting considerations) in which financial institutions would prefer this program to the troubled asset purchase program? Please describe.

 

7.1 Does this preference differ by type and condition of the asset? For what troubled assets might financial institutions choose to participate in the guarantee program rather than sell under the troubled asset purchase program? Is accommodating this choice likely to best promote the goals of the EESA? Does it adequately protect the taxpayer? If not, what design feature should be included to assure these goals are met?